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DEEDS -

DESCRIPTION -

LATENT

AMBIGUITY

-

PAROL EVIDENCE, Mudd et al. v. Dillon, 65 S. W. Rep.
973. (Supreme Court of Missouri, December 17, 1901.)Of the several points involved in the decision of this case there
is but one that we desire to notice. The following abstract from
the facts will disclose it:
The grantor, John S. Dillon, under whom the defendant
claims, in July, 1890, was the owner of 440 acres of land in sections 12 and 13, township 50, of range 4, in the county of Montgomery, state of Missouri. By the deed upon which the defence
reted he purported to convey "80 acres, the E. I of the N. E.
and 60 acres off of the E. side of the W. I of the N. E. of Sec.
12, and 80 acres of the E. I of the N. E. , of Sec. 13, in the
county of Montgomery, state of Missouri." It will be observed
that the township and range were omitted.
The plaintiffs claimed that no land passed by the deed, because
none was sufficiently described. Against this the defendant con-

NOTES.

tended that the omission of the towvhip and range raised, only
a latent ambiguity which could be explained-by proof of what
land the giantor owned and other extrinsic evidence. The
court (opinion by Burgess, J., all concurring), took judicial
notice of the fact that there were fourteen different sections of
land numbered 12, and thirteen numbered 13 in the county
where the land was situated, and held that consequently there
was a patent ambiguity in the deed which could not be cured by
evidence aliunde.
The familiar rule that a latent ambiguity in a document can
be cured by parol evidence, while a patent ambiguity cannot,
was derived from one of Lord Bacon's maxims (Bac. Max. Reg.
25 or 23). That when he said, "Ambiguitas verborum latens
verificatione suppletur, nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum venficatione facti tollitur," he referred to the verification in pleading and not to evidence, was lo'ng ago lost sight of, and the confusion resulting therefrom seems to increase with each expression of judicial opinion involving the question.
To show how the courts have treated this distinction between.
latent and patent ambiguity; to inquire how far it is a valid
and valuable distinction; to arrive at a conclusion as to how it
should be interpreted and applied, and to test the decision in
this case by that coficlusion will be the object of this note.
The following have been held to be patent ambiguities:
IMPERFECT Olt INDEFINITE DESCRIPTION OF PERSON OR THING.

-Doe v. Tyrrell, 4 M. & S. 550, 1816, description of land;
Chambers v. Ringstaff, 69 Ala. 140, 1881; Mesick v. Sunderland,
6 Cal. 297, 1856, grant of 220 town lots; White v. Hermann,
51 Ill. 243, 1869, omission of "North of base line," and range.
Rule disregarded ! Grimes Ex'r. v. Harman, 35 Ind. 198, 1871,
bequest to Orthodox Protestant clergymen,-no such corporation; Baldwin v. Kerlin, 46 Ind. 426, 1874, contract for "640
acres of land in A. Co., Kan."; Craven v. Butterfield,80 Ind. 503,
1881, "27 acres in fractional section 15, V. County"; Fenwici v.
Floyd, 1 Har. & G. 172, Md. 1827, 'Tart of Resurrection
Manor"; Huntt v. Gist, 2 Rar. & J. 498, Md., 1809, "120 acres
of Park's Death Khot," the latter being a much larger tract;
Dashiell v. Atty. General, 6 Ear. & J. I Md., 1823, bequest to
"poor children of C. County"; Stokeley v. Gordon, 8 Md. 496,
1855; Palmer v. Albee, 50 Ia. 429, 1879, "20 acres of land";
McNair v. Toler, 5 Min. 453, 1861; Brown v. Guice, 46 Miss.
299, 1872, 'Tartof Sec. 18, Tp. 7, range 2, E. 180 acres"; Webster v. Atkinson, 4 N. H. 21, 1827, whether deed conveyed twothirds interest) joint or several; Ciipps v. Holt, 5 Jones Eq. 153,
N. Car., 1859; Norris v. Hunt, 51 Tex. 609, 1879; McKinzie v.
Stafford, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 121, 1894; Pingrey v. Watkins, 17
Vt. 379, 1845; Pitts v. Brown, 49 Vt. 86, 1876.
MEANING OF WORDS.-England.--Cheyney's Case 5 Coke Rep.
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68, 1592, "They or any of them shall not alien"; Strode v. Russell,
Z Vern. 621, 1708, "out of settlement."
Canada.-Connolly
v. ProvincialIns. Co., 3 Q. L. R. 6, Quebec, 1876, "vessel to go out in tow."
Alabama.--Johnsonv. Johnson, 32 Ala. 637, 1858, "vest absolutely"; Abercrombie's Bex'r v. Abererombie's Heir, 27 Ala. 489,.
1855, antecedent of pron'oun "their."
Illinois.-Doyle v. Teas, 5 Ill. 202, 1843, "a certain sum";
Panton v. Tefft, 22 Ill. 366, 1859, "also"; Griffith v. Furry, 30
Ill. 251, 1863, "$245, ten per cent."
Indiana.-Richmond Tr. & Mfr. Co. v. Farquar, 8 Blackf.
89, 1846, book entry.
Massachusetts.-Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 453, 1810,
"shore"; King v. King, 7 Mass. 495, 1811, "mill privilege";
Comstock v. Van Deusen, 5 Pick. 163, 1827, "right of way
across."
Michigan.-Rood v. School Dist. No. 7, 1 Dougl. 502, 1844,
whether "P." and "D." on docket entry stood for plaintiff and
defendant.
New Yorlc.-Mann v. Mann, 1 Johns. Ch. 231, 1814,
"moneys"; Blosburg R. R. Co. v. Tioga R. R. Co., 1 Keyes, 486,
1864, "additional charges by way of discrimination, etc.'
Tennessee.-Nashville Life Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 8 Lea, 499,
1881, non-forfeiting clause in life insurance policy.
North Carolina.-Taylor v. Maris, 90 N. C. 619, 1884, "etc."
Virginia.-Gatewood v. Burns, 3 Call. 194, 1802, "etc."
OmIssiows.-Newcomer v. Kline, 11 Gill & Johnson, 457,
Md., 1841; Clark v. Lancaster,36 Md. 196, 1872; Hyatt v. Pugsley, 23 Barb. 285, N. Y., 1856; Vandervoort v. Dewey, 42 Hun,
68, 1886; Noyes v. Staff, 5 Ore. 455, 1875.
DOUBLE MEAINos.-Saunderson v. Piper,5 Bing. N. C. 425,
1839, figures on draft expressing one sum, words, another; Hollier v. Eyre, 9 Cl. & F. 1, 1840, annuity granted as principal or
surety? Brandon v. Leddy, 67 Cal. 43, 1885, map referred to
in deed shows two lots answering description; Cadwallader v.
Nash, 73 Cal. 43, 1887, reference applying equally to two different maps; Bisbee v. Woodbury, 8 Ill. App. 336, 1880, nol. pros.
entered on note applying equally to two; Mithoff v. Byrne, 20
La. Ann. 363, 1868, party contracting as agent or principal;
Brauns v. Stearns, 1 Ore. 367, 1861, deed, A. called maker, executed by B.; Wright v. Weafley, 2 Watts, 89 Pa., 1833, joint
note signed by one obligor as agent; Stecher v. Cor., 6 Whart.
60, Pa., 1840, doubtful balance in auditor's report.
The following have been held to be latent ambiguities:
SUBJECT WRONGLY OR IMPERFECTLY DESCRIBED.-Miller v.
Travers, 8 Bing. 244, 1833; Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 210,
1885; Allen v. Lyons, 2 Wash. 475, U. S., 1811; Cato v. Stewart,
28 Ark. 146, 1873; Piper v. True, 36 Cal. 606, 1869; Blair v.
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Bruns, 8 Col. 397, 1885; Lyman v. Gadney, 114 III. 388, 1885;
Decker v. Decker, 121 Ill. 341, 1887; Breckenridge.v. Duncan,
2 A. K. Marsh, 50, Ky., 1817; Breeding v. Taylor, 13 B. MoI.
287, Ky., 1852; Haydon v. Ewing, 1 B. Mon. 111, Ky., 1840;
Tudor v. Terrel, 2 Dana, 47, Ky., 1834; Mead v. Parker, 115
Mass. 413, 1874; Cleverly v. Cleverly, 124 Mass. 314, 1878;
Riggs v. Myers, 20 Mo. 239, 1854; Hardy v. Matthews, 38 Mo.
122, 1886; Greenleaf v. Kilton, 11 N. H. 530, 1841; Winkley v.
Kaime, 32 N. H. 268, 1855; French v. Hayes, 43 N. H. 30,
1861; Griscom v. Evans, 4G N. J. L. 402, 1878; Doe v. Roe, 1
Wend. 541, N. Y., 1828; Mann v. Mann, 1 Johns. Ch. 234, N. Y.,
1814; Merrick v. Merrick, 37 Ohio St. 126, 1881; Caldwell v.
Carthage, 40 Ohio St. 453, 1884; Busby v. Bush, 79 Tex. 656,
1891.
OB3JECT WRONGLY OR IMPERFECTLY DEscRBEDi.--Brewster

v. McCall, 15 Conn. 274, 1842; Beardsley v. Home Miss. Soo.,
45 Conn. 327, 1877; Bowen v. Slaughter, 24 Ga. 339, 1857;
Walker v. Wells, 25 Ga. 141, 1858; Richards v. Miller, 62 Ill.
417, 1872; Hinkley v. Thatcher, 139 Mass. 477, 1885; Howard
v. Am. Bible Soc., 49 Me. 288, 1860; Taylor v. Tolen, 38 N. J.
Eq. 91, 1884; Gallup v. Wright, 61 How. Pr. 284, N. Y., 1881;
Lefevre v. Lefevre, 59 N. Y. 434, 1875; Gardner v. Heyer, 2
Paige, 11, N. Y.,* 1829; Vernor v. Henry, 3 Watts, 385, Pa.,
1834; Washington University's Appeal, 111 Pa. 572, 1886;
Newell's Appeal, 24 Pa. 197, 1855; Hawkins v. Garland, 76 Va.
149, 1882.
DESCmIPTION APPLICABLE TO MORE THAN ONE PERSON OR

T=
.- England.-n re Kilvert's Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq. 183,
1871; Grant v. Grant, L. R. 5 C. P. 380, 1870; Doe v. Beynon,
12 Ad. & El. 431, 1840; Fleming v. Fleming, 1 H. & 0. 242,
1862; Webber v. Corbett, L. R. 16 Eq. 515, 1873; In rz Gregory's
Settlement, 34 Bear. 500, 1865; In re Wolverton's Estate, 7 Oh.
Div. 197, 1877; Doe v. Lyford, 4 M. & S. 550, 1816.
United States.-Deery v. Cray, 10 Wall. 263, 'U. S., 1869;
Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U. S. 588, 1886.
Connecticut.-Coitv. Starkweather,8 Conn. 389, 1830; Doolittle v. Blakesley, 4 Day, 265, 1810; Brewster v. McCall, 15
Conn. 274, 1842; Dunham v. Averill,.45 Conn. 61, 1877.
Illinois.-Dougherty v. Purdy, 18 IR. 206, 1856; Clark v.
Powers, 45 Ill. 283, 1867; Bybee v. Hageman., 66 1I. 519, 1872;
Billings v. Kankakee Coal Co., 67 Ill. 489, 1872; Bradley v.
Bees, 113 Ill. 327, 1885; Bradish v. Yocum, 130 Il. 386, 1889;
School Trustees v. Rodgers, 7 Il. App. 33, 1880.
Kentucky.-Cromie v. Louisville Orph. Home, 3 Bush, 386,
Ky., 1867; Shelby v. Teris; 14 S. W. Rep. 501, 1890.
Maine.-Emery v. Webster, 42 Me. 204, 1856; Howard v.
American Peace Society, 49 Me. 288, 1860; Tyler v. Fickett, 73
Me. 410, 1882.
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Mdssachusetts:-Gerrishv. Towne, 3 Gray, 82, 1852; Woods
v. Sawin, 4 Gray, 322, 1855; Davis v. Sherman, 7 Gray, 291,
1856; Bodman v. Am. Tract Society, 9 Allen, 447,1864; Sargent
v. Towne, 10 Mass. 303, 1813; Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545,
1868; Putnam v. Bond, 100 Mass. 58, 1868; Ohester Emery Co.
v. Lucas, 112 Mass. 424, 1873; Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413,
1874; Hoar v. Goulding, 116 Mass. 132, 1874; Flagg v. Mason,
141 Mass. 64, 1886; Thornell v. Brockton, 141 Mass. 151, 1886;
Michigan.-Waldron v. Waldron, 45 Mich. 350, 1881.
Minnesota.-Slosson v. Hall, 17 Minn. 95, 1871.
Missouri.-Hardy v. Matthews, 38 Mo. 121, 1866; Schreiber
v. Osten, 50 Mo. 513, 1872; Goff v. Roberts, 72 Mo. 570, 1880;
Coe v. Bitter, 86 Mo. 277, 1885.
New Hampshire.-Claremontv. Carlton, 2 N. H. 369, 1821;
Clough v. Bowman, 15 N. H. 504, 1844; Hall v. Davis, 36 N.
H. 569, 1857; Goodhue v. Clark, 37 N. H. 525, 1859; Tilton v.
Am. Bible Soc., 60 N. H. 377, 1880.
New Jersey.-Denv. Cubberly, 12 N. 5. L. 308, 1831; Opdye
v. Stephens, 28 N. J. L. 83, 1859; Curtis v. Aaronson, 49 N. J.
L. 68, 1886.
New Mexico.-Gentile v. Crossan, 7 N. Alex. 589, 1894.
New York.-Jackson v. Goes, 13 Johns. 518, 1876; St. Luke's
v. Association, etc., 52 N. Y. 191, 1873.
North Carolina.-Lowe v. Carter, 2 Jones Eq. 377, 1856;
Clarke v. Cotton, 2 Dev. Eq. 51, 1831.
Ohio.-Black v. Hill, 32 Ohio St. 313, 1877.
Pennsylvania.-Vernorv. Henry, 3 Watts, 385, 1875; Brown"field v. Brownfield, 12 Pa. 136, 1849; McCulough Y. W
Vainwright, 14 Pa. 171, 1850; Hetherington v. Clark, 30 Pa. 393,
1858; Koch v. Dinkle, 90 Pa. 264, 1879; Place v. Proctor,
2 Penny, 264, 1882.
Tennessee.-Gass v. Ross, 3 Sneed, 211, 1855; Snodgrass v.
Ward, 3 ilayw. 40, 1860; Mum ford v. Memphis, etc., 2 Lea, 393,
1819.
Texas.-Early v. Sterrctt, 18 Tex. 116, 1856; Hamman v.
Keigwin, 39 Tex. 34, 1873; Bassett v. Martin, 83 Tex. 339,
1892.
Vermont.-Townsend v. Downer, 23 Vt. 225, 1851; Button v.
Amer. Tract Society, 23 Vt. 336, 1851.
Virginia.-Mound v. M'Phail, 10 Leigh, 189, 1839.
Washington.-Read v. Tacoma Bldg. Assoc., 2 Wash. 198,
1891.
Wisconsin.-Morgav v. Burrows, 45 Wis. 211, 1878; Begg v.
Begg, 56 Wis. 534, 1882; Meade v. Gilfoyle, 64 Wis. 18, 1885;
Begg v. Anderson, 64 Wis. 207, 1885; Webst& v. Morris, 66
Wis. 366. 1886.
Canada.-Clark-v. Bonnycastle, 3 IT. C. Q. B. (0. S.) 528,
1834.
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MISCEiANEOUS.-MISDEScRIPTION IN LOCATION OF PROPERTY.

-Sullivan v. Collins, 20 Colo. 528, 1895; McLennan v. Johnsfon, 306, 1871; Chicago Dock Co. v. Kinzie, 93 Ill. 428, 1879;
Sharp v. Thompson, 100 IM. 448, 1881; Mason v. Merrill, 129
fli. 503, 1889; Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Me. 575, 1863; Crafts v.
Hibbard,4 Met. 438, Mass., 1842; Morton v. Jackson, 1 Smed.
& M. 494, Miss., 1843; Edwards v. Tipton, 77 N. Car. 222,
1837; Webb v. Frazar,29 S. W. Rep. 665, Tex, 1895; Thompson
v. Jones, 4 Wis. 106, 1855.
Two D0cumENTs APPLYING TO SAM PROPERTY.-Fisk v.
Fisk, 12 Cush. 150, Mass., 1853; Thayer v. Torrey, 37 N. J. L.
339, 1875.
Two MODES 0F PERFoRnANCE OF CONTRAcT.-Smith v. Aikin,
75 Ala. 209, 1883; Collins v. Driscoll, 34 Conn. 43, 1867; Manchester PaperCo. v. Moore, 104Nl. Y. 680, 1887; Cole v. Wendel,
8 Johns. 116 N. Y., 1811.
WHAT THE COLORING ON MAP TO AccomPANY DEED MEANT.

-Board of Eduction v. Keenan, 55 Cal. 642, 1880.
SREFERENCE IN DEED TO A LOST PLOT.-Deery v. Cray, 10 Wall.
263, U. S., 1869.
WRITTEN WORDS ON PRINTED DOCUMENT NOT AGREEING wITH
A DOCUMENT
IREFEiED TO IN THE PINT.-The Wanderer, 29,

Fed. 260, U. S. D. C., Eastern Dist. So. Car., 1886.
WHETHER A PARTY SIGNE

CONTRACT AS PRINcIPA

OR AS

AGENT.-Shuetze v. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69, 1867.
M{EANING OF "RED. ON SETTLEMENT TO DAT."-Clay v.
Field, 138 U. S. 461, 1890.
WHo WAS CORPORATION OBaGoR ON Bo.-Franli Av.
German San. Inst. v. Town of Roscoe, 75 Mo. 408, 1882.
LOCATION OF VARIABLE BouNDARY.-Waterman v. Johnson,
1, Pick. 261, Mass., 1832.
INCONSISTENT DEVISES IN SA-M WILL.-Brown v. Brown,
43 N. H. 17, 1861.
The subject of patent and latent ambiguities and the rule regulating the admission of evidence to explain them, has received
but little legislative attention. The Georgia Code, however, has
this provision relative thereto: "Parol evidence is admissible

to explain all ambiguities, both latent and patent." This was
enacted in the Code of 1882, Section 3,801, and was reenacted
in the Code of 1895, Section 5,202, which would seem to indicate
that the abolition of the distinction had met with general approval. Decisions under this provision are: Ferrell v. Hurst, 68

Ga. 132, 1881; Turner v. Berry, 74 Ga. 481, 1885; Jennings v.
Athens Nat. Bank, 74 Ga. 782, 1885; Riley v. Hicks, 81 Ga. 265,
1888; American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Ga. Construction Co.,
87 Ga. 651, 1891; Neal v. Reams, 88 Ga. 298, 1891; Wheelwright v. Aiken, .92 Ga. 394, 1895.
So much for the first point, that is, the way in which courts
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and legisltive bodies have treated the rule derived from Lord
Bacon's maxim. We turn now to a critical examination of the
theory of the rule.
It is believed that in nearly all cases of so-called ambiguity
the facts can be thrown into the following classification:
I. Where the document read alone or with the aid of extrinsic
evidence has no, or more than one equally clear, logical meaning.
II. Where the document read alone apparently has no, or
more than one, such meaning; but proof of some extrinsic fact
shows it to have one, and only one, logical meaning.
III. Where the document, however read, has such a meaning;
but proof of some extrinsic fact shows no, or more than one,
way in which to effect it.
IV. Where the document, however read, has such a meaning,
and proof of some extrinsic fact shows no, or more than one,
way in which to effect it; but proof of additional facts shows that
one, and only one, way of effecting it could have been meant.
A close examination of these possible combinations reveals the
fact that there are really two different kinds of meaning involved.
The first may be called the logical; the second, the executable
meaning. The question in the first instance is, does the document convey any idea; in the second, granted that it does convey an idea, is it one which can be carried into effect. The first
is obtained by reading the document generally, as language; the
second, by reading it particularly, as language applicable to certain subjects and objects.
:Now since ambiguity may signify either of doubtful meaning
or of double meaning, it appears that from the two kinds of
meaning indicated above we may derive four kinds of ambiguity,
viz:
(1) Where it is doubtful whether the document has any logical
meaning or not.
(2) Where there is a question as to which of two or more
logical meanings is the proper one.
(3) Where it is doubtful whether the document has any
executable meaning or not, and
(4) Where there is a question as to which of two or more
executable meanings is the proper one.
Any one or all of these questions may arise in the determination of the meaning of any document; indeed, the first and
the third must always be settled in the affirmative before the
document can be given any force. They may be answered unconsciously; but they must, nevertheless, be answered.
In any one of these cases extrinsic evidence may be admitted
for the purpose of dispelling the ambiguity in the document.
An example of the first may be found in the case of Kell v.
Charmer, 23 Beav. 195, 1856, in which a testator gave i. x. x.
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pounds to one son and o. x. x. pounds to another son. It was
proved extrinsically that according to his business price-mark
these seemingly meaningless symbols meant respectively £100
and £200, and the will was given effect accordingly. Another
illustration would be the case put by Wigram (Ext. Ev. s. 79).
Suppose a legacy to one of the children of A., by her late husband B. Apparently this has no logical meaning, since one
cannot give to one of several without designating which one;
but if it appear extrinsically that A. had only one son by B., and
that the fact was known to the testator, "INo principle or rule of
law would," he says, "preclude a court from acting upon the
evidence of facts by which the meaning of an apparently ambiguous will would, in such a case, be reduced to a certainty."
Similar would be the case put by Elphinstone (Interp. of Formal
Documents, 3 Jurid. Soc. Pap.. p. 266), "I give my dog Ranger
to my nephew John or Thomas." This appears meaningless
for the reason given above; but if it appear that John and
Thomas are but two names by which the same person was known
to him at the time, the ambiguity disappears.
An illustration of the second sort of ambiguity named above
is put by Eyre, L. C. B., in Gibson v. Minet, 1 H. Bl. p. 615,
1791. A grant by two, one in possession, the other in reversion,
is interpreted, in view of the facts, as the grant of the first and
the confirmation of the second. So also Coke points out that
dedi or concessi may amount to a grant, a feoffment, a gift, a
lease, a release, a confirmation, a surrender, etc., according to the
condition of the parties appearing extrinsically, Coke, Litt.
301, b.
As an illustration of the third sort of ambiguity the case of
Miller v. T'avers, 8 Bing. 244, 1833, is cited. The document
contained a logically expressed devise of all the testator's estates
in the county of Limerick. The fact that he owned practically
no estates in that county, but did own large estates in the county
of Clare, was allowed to appear; and it finally settled, in the
negative, the doubt whether the will could be given effect or not.
Extrinsic facts were admitted to aid the court in deciding the
fourth sort of ambiguiity in the case of Tilton v. The Amer. Bible
Soc., 60 N. H. 377, 1880. Here there was a bequest "to The
Bible Society," and it appeared in evidence that there were several Bible Societies in existence. Evidence dehors the will was
admitted to show which one was meant.
Extrinsic facts being admissable in all of these cases to reduce
the ambiguity to a certainty, it must be determined whether all
such facts can be admitted.
* Since it is always the object of the court to obtain the author's
meaning in the document, and not dehors the document, other
expressions of his intention are received only upon the greatest
necessity. The -admission of such expressiQns of intention is
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generally limited to cases containing an dmbiguity of the fourth
kind, Bradley v. Bees, 113 Ill. 327, 1885.
Now since an ambiguity as t6 the logical meaning of a document must appear if at all upon the face of the document, it
follows that the facts admissible as evidence are only such as
tend to reduce the meaning to certainty. This applies to kinds
of ambiguity number 1 and number 2 as indicated above. In the
interpretation of any document there must always arise from the
mere reading of the document a doubt as to whether it can be
given any effect or not (Ambiguity No. 3, supra). This is well
expressed by Holmes, J., in Doherty v. Hill, 144 Mass. p. 468,
1888. He says, "In every case the words used must be translated
into things and facts by parol evidence." It is evident that in
this process of translation one of three conditions may appear:
the document may have one clear application to persons or things;
or it may have no clear application; or it may have more than
one equally clear application. If the first appears there is no
difficulty, and there is nothing to do but go ahead and give effect
to this meaning. If the second appears evidence is admissible
to show that what apparently has no clear application to persons
or things in reality has such an application. If the third
appears, evidence, even to the extent of the author's intent dehors
the document, is admissible. This is the fourth kind of ambiguity noted above.
It is apparent from the foregoing that when either ambiguity
number 3 or ambiguity number 4 is to be dealt with, there are
two classes of facts to be considered: the first, which tend to
raise the ambiguity; and the second, which tend to dispel it.
The first class of facts must always be admitted, for without
them the document cannot at all be applied to extrinsic matter;
the second class of facts may always be admitted when the proof
of the facts of the first class does, indeed, raise a doubt as how to
apply it.
This discussion and classification of the facts which are provable in cases of ambiguity has necessarily been obiter. To
resume the discussion of the validity of the distinction between
latent and patent: it would seem that if anything could be called
a patent ambiguity, it would be the contents of a document which
apparently had no logical meaning upon its face, to a person
of ordinary intelligence. It is often defined as "That which
appears to be uncertain upon the deed or instrument," Craven
v. Butterfield, 80 Ind. 503, 1881, cited with approval in the
principal case. But it has been shown above that in cases
answering exactly to this definition extrinsic evidence has been
properly admitted. It seems, therefore, that the rule as ordinarily stated does not contain a valid and valuable distinction,
when it makes patency and latency the test of whether extrinsic
evidence shall be admitted or not.
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Broom, in his Legal.Maxims, 612, seemed to understand the
worthlessness of the distinction when he said that extrinsic evidence is undoubtedly admissible for showing that the uncertainty which exists on the face of the instrument does not in
fact exist But this is not, as he says, a qualification of the
rule; it does away with the distinction altogether, for its effect
is exactly contrary. It is saying that what is apparently uncertain, j. e., patently ambiguous, may be rendered certain by
means of extrinsic evidence; in other words, that a document as
meaningless as pied type can be shown to have a clear, logical
meaning by the proof that it is in a cipher which the author
was accustomed to use.
Now there are undoubtedly cases in which no evidence can be
admitted to clear up the ambiguity apparent in the document.
Such a case is that of a document in which the name of the
grantee or the donee is left blank, Clayton v. Nugent, 13 M. &
W. 200, 1844. Another is the familiar case of a devise "to -one
of the sons of J. S.'" Strode v. Russell, 2 Vern. 624, 1708. Such
also would be the imaginary' case, sometimes put, of a devise, as
follows: "To John, Whiteacre and Greenacre and Blackaere, to
Thomas." But to say that the extrinsic evidence cannot be
admitted because the ambiguity appears on the face of the instrument is going too far. It is because the court can take the document and say of it that no matter how read, or with the aid
of whatever evidence, one, clear logical meaning could not be
derived from it. With this limitation alone, it is submitted,
the extrinsic evidence should be admitted. And the reason for
this limitation .ppears clearly; to go farther is not to derive a
meaning from the document, but to give a meaning to it.
To restate the conclusion; it is that when the document shows
on its face that in the light of all possible facts it cannot possibly have one clear, logical meaning, then, and then only, may
it be said to be "patently ambiguous," and the rule of exclusion
be applied. It must be possible to say of the author of the document, "Quod voluit non dixit." Then the court will not allow
other facts to come in to aid them in expressing a wish for him.
It is against this possibility, namely, that the court will create
and then express our intentions for the author of the document,
instead of discovering his intent as expressed in the document,
that these barriers are, and should be, so sedulously maintained;
and it is this same possibility which makes it questionable
whether any expressions of the author's intent, dehors the document and not part of the'res gests, should ever be admitted in
evidence to explain the document.
It remains to apply this conclusion to the facts of the present
ease, and test the decision thereby. It is believed that the decision is incorrect by the rule as generally broadly stated; a
fortiori is it so by the dimited construction placed upon the rule
by the conclusion above deduced.
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The description of the land in the grant in the immediate case
was not patently ambiguous in its broad sense, because read alone
it conveyed a perfectly clear logical idea, namely, that there were
in that county certain numbered sections, parts of which were,
by that deed transferred to other ownership. It was not until
the extrinsic fact that there were more sections than one having
the same numbers appeared, that any doubt as to its meaning
could arise. It is submitted that the learned court was misled
by reading its judicial notice of the fact of the existence of more
than one section having the same number within the county into
the document, and then deciding that it contained a patent
ambiguity.
It is evident that the deed could, in view of all possible facts,
have one clear, logical meaning. It was then a proper case in
which to attempt to apply its provisions to extrinsic things in
order to give them effect. It is true that the first step in this
process, from the judicial notice above referred to, raised a doubt
as to what land was intended to be conveyed; but because of this
-very doubt raised by the extrinsic fact it was a case of latent
ambiguity, which evidence of the fact that the testator only owned
land in one section 12 and in one section 13 of that county and
therefore could have intended to convey that alone, would have
immediately dispelled.
T.M.P.

